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During the next decades the populations of most developed countries will grow older as a 
result of the low level of birth rates since the 1970s and/or the continuously increasing life 
expectancy. We show within a Generational Accounting framework how unsustainable the 
public finances of France, Germany, Switzerland and the U.S. are, given their demographic 
developments. Thereby, our focus lies on social health insurance systems which are in 
addition affected by the medical-technical progress. Due to the cost-increasing effect of 
the medical-technical progress one can justifiably say that social health insurance schemes 
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During the next few decades the populations of most developed countries will grow 
older as a result of the low level of birth rates since the 1970s and/or the continuously 
increasing life expectancy. For some countries both is the case which is why this 
phenomenon is sometimes referred to as the double-ageing process. While most of the 
political discussions addressing this fact point on the financing problems in public pension 
systems, the academic community is emphasizing that the problem will be even bigger in 
public health insurance systems. This is not only due to the demographic transition but 
even more to the nature of the medical-technical progress which occurs rather in cost-
increasing product innovations than in cost-decreasing process innovations. Caused by the 
medical-technical progress and without any major demographic shifts, statutory health 
care expenditures in major OECD countries increased faster than their economic output 
over the last three decades – in some more as twice as fast. These are alarming results 
given that the demographic transition is irreversible and thus the political pressure for a 
widening of benefits will rather increase than decline in an ageing society. 
To analyse the extent of the problem mentioned above, we compute Generational 
Accounts and a set of sustainability indicators for the public and the health sector of 
France, Germany, Switzerland and the U.S. A comparison of these four countries is of 
special interest because their health insurance systems and demographics are significantly 
different from each other. This promises to yield interesting insights into the relevance of 
different factors for the sustainability of fiscal (health) policies. The U.S. is a rare example for 
an OECD country with no universal public health insurance system. While its fertility rate is 
relatively “healthy”, its large baby-boomer generations are a challenge for one of its major 
health programs, Medicare. In contrast the French system seems already in trouble. Annual 
deficits of its social flagship urge for reform. And the future does not look bright either. 
Although blessed with a relative high fertility rate compared to other European countries, 
the French population is ageing rapidly and the tax burden is already relatively (some say 
too) high. Similarly, the new “sick man of Europe”, Germany, may be as well so sick because 
of the high public expenditures for health care. Having had a “reform for the next century” 
in 2004, contribution rates are already rising again. To avoid increasing the burden for 
labour in its wage-based system, political parties are arguing how to reform the revenue 
side of the system. But with a declining population, any approach in a pay-as-you-go 
design will be doomed to failure as the case of Switzerland shows. Having a new and 
relatively modern health insurance system, the lump-sum premiums of its hybrid public-
  1private system are rising faster than any indicator of income and so does the subsidies for 
these premiums of the government. 
This study wants to quantify the prior outlined problems and compare our results 
between the certain countries. The paper is structured as follows: Chapter 2 describes 
briefly the method of Generational Accounting and the calculation of the sustainability 
indicators used. Generational Accounting was invented in the early nineties to estimate 
both explicit and implicit debt of public coffers in the long run. Subsection 2.2 then reports 
the sources of our data for the analysis of the four countries. Generational Accounting 
needs three kinds of data, a population projection, age- and sex-specific profiles and a 
general government budget of a certain base year. Furthermore we discuss our choice for 
global parameters (i.e. growth and discount rates) and how we account for the 
expenditure-increasing effects of the medical-technical progress. In chapter 3 we describe 
every analysed health care system briefly and report the first findings of the sustainability 
of their fiscal (or health) policy. We report the Generational Accounts of every system and 
discuss them in detail together with our first indicator, the so called sustainability gap. In 
chapter 4 other indicators are compared and their shortcomings are discussed. 
Furthermore we give possible explanations for the differences of the countries’ 
sustainability. Chapter 5 summarizes and concludes the paper. 
 
2.   Generational Accounting – Method, Data and Assumptions 
This section covers the methodology of our empirical framework Generational Accounting 
and gives a broad overview over the certain sources of our data for the different countries. 
Furthermore, for our comparison in chapter 4, we have to make certain assumptions about 
the growth of technical progress and a discount rate for all analysed fiscal systems. Since 
this paper focuses on the social health insurance schemes, we also make certain 
assumptions about the way to account for the medical-technical progress and the aligned 
pressure on health care expenditures. 
 
2.1   Methodology 
To measure the sustainability of a country’s public sector we use the method of 
Generational Accounting developed by Auerbach, Gokhale and Kotlikoff (1991, 1992, and 
1994). In contrast to traditional budget indicators which are based on annual cash-flow 
  2budgets, Generational Accounting is founded on the intertemporal budget constraint and 
therefore the long-term implications of a current policy can be computed.
1  
Like stated above, the starting point of Generational Accounting is the intertemporal 
budget constraint of the public sector, expressed in present value terms of a base year t: 
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Let  D denote agents' maximum age and   the present value of year t’s net tax 
payments, i.e., taxes paid net of transfers received, made by all members of a generation 
born in year k over the remaining life cycle. Then, the first right-hand term of equation (1) 
represents the aggregate net taxes of all generations alive in the base year t. The second 
term aggregates the net tax payments made by future generations born in year t + 1 or 
later. Together this is equal to the left-hand side of equation (1),  , which stands for the 
net debt in year t. That means if the sum of all living generations’ net taxes, ∑ , is 
negative (i.e. if they receive a net transfer) the sum of future generations’ net taxes has to 
be positive to balance the government’s intertemporal budget – or in other words: In a 
long-term perspective net transfers received by living generations plus the net debt of the 
base year have to be financed via net taxes paid by future generations. 
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To calculate generations' aggregate life cycle net tax payments, the net payment terms 
in equation (1) are decomposed into 
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In equation (2),  denotes the average net tax paid in year s by a representative member 
of the generation born in year k, whereas   stands for the number of members of a 
generation born in year k who survives until year s. Typically, generational accountants 
disaggregate equation (2) even further. To incorporate gender-specific differences in 
average tax payments and transfer receipts by age, separate aggregation of the average 
net taxes paid by male and female cohort members is required. The products aggregated 
in equation (2) represent the net taxes paid by all members of generation k in year s. For 
generations born prior to the base year the summation starts from year t, while for future 
born cohorts, the summation starts in year k > t. Irrespective of the year of birth, all 
payments are discounted back to year t by application of a real interest rate r. 
k s T ,
k s P ,
                                                 
1  The further description of the methodology of Generational Accounting is mainly based on 
Raffelhüschen (1999). Raffelhüschen (1999) discusses also the shortcomings of Generational Accounting in 
detail. 
  3To compute the remaining lifetime net payments of living generations, the future 
demographic structure is specified conducting long-term population forecasts. In addition, 
the development of age-specific net tax payments needs to be projected. 
The age-specific net tax payment in year s of agents born in year k can be decomposed as 
(3)      ,, , s ks
i
Th = k i ∑  
i k s h , ,  stands for the average tax or transfer of type i paid or received in year s by agents 
born in year k, thus of age s - k. In equation (3), h > 0 indicates a tax payment, whereas 
h < 0 defines a transfer. 
Applying the method of Generational Accounting it is conventionally assumed that 
initial fiscal policy and economic behaviour are constant over time. Under this condition it 
is possible to project future average tax payments and transfer receipts per capita from the 
base year age profile of payments according to 
(4)      () ( ) ,, ,, 1
s t
ski tt s k i hh g
−
−− =+  
where g represents the annual rate of productivity growth. Equation (4) assigns to each 
agent of age s-k in year s the tax and transfer payment observed for agents of the same 
age in base year t, uprated for gains in productivity. The base year cross section of age-
specific tax and transfer payments per capita is generally determined in two steps. First, 
the relative position of age cohorts in the tax and transfer system is estimated from micro-
data profiles. In a second step the relative age profiles are re-evaluated proportionally to fit 
the expenditures and tax revenues. 
For living generations, division of the aggregate remaining lifetime net tax payments 
by the number of cohort members alive in the base year defines the cohort generational 
account: 











The Generational Accounts are constructed in a purely forward-looking manner, only the 
taxes paid and the transfers received in or after the base year are considered. As a 
consequence, Generational Accounts cannot be compared across living generations 
because they incorporate effects of differential lifetime. One may compare, however, the 
Generational Accounts of base year and future born agents, who are observed over their 
entire life cycle. 
  4To illustrate the fiscal burden of current fiscal policy we use four sustainability 
indicators:
2 The starting point for the first indicators are the intertemporal public liabilities 
which can be computed by the assumption that the intertemporal budget constraint of 
the public sector (1a) is violated: 
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The amount of intertemporal public liabilities measures aggregate unfunded claims on 
future budgets, assuming that the present policy will hold for the future. The first 
sustainability indicator, the sustainability gap, can be derived if the intertemporal public 
liabilities are set in relation to base year’s GDP. This indicator is akin to the debt quota but 
it addresses to the debt which will occur in the future and not in the past. 
How the policy adjustment required to redeem intertemporal public liabilities will 
affect generations' fiscal burdens is uncertain. For illustrative purposes, Generational 
Accounting typically assigns the entire adjustment to future generations. All tax payments 
made by members of future born cohorts are adjusted proportionally with help of a 
uniform scaling factor θ . θ  is set to ensure balance of the intertemporal public budget 
defined in equation (1) 
(7)      () ( ) ,, ,, 1
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for and instead of equation (4). Computing the average age-specific net taxes paid by 
representative future born agents, the burden for future generations can be illustrated as 
an absolute difference between the generational account of the base year agent and the 
generational account of the one year after base year born agent. This is our second 
sustainability indicator, the future generations’ burden which we will compute in the next 
chapters. 
The third indicator that illustrates the burden of current fiscal policy is the revenue 
gap. In this case the scaling factor  rev θ θ =  reflects the increase of revenues in per cent 
for all generations that is necessary to close the intertemporal public budget constraint. It 
can also be interpreted as the ratio of the intertemporal public liabilities to the present 
value of all revenues of the fiscal system. 
Analogue to the revenue gap, we compute also the so called transfer gap. In this case 
the scaling factor  trf θ θ =  reflects the necessary decrease of public transfers like health 
benefits in per cent for all generations that is necessary to close the intertemporal public 
budget constraint. 
                                                 
2 For a discussion of measuring fiscal sustainability and sustainability indicators, see Benz and Fetzer (2004). 
  52.2   Data and Assumptions 
To compute Generational Accounts and to calculate the stated indicators for our cross-
country-analysis, we require a projection of each population, the expenditures and 
revenues of the public sector like stated in their national accounts in the base year, age-
sex-profiles for the different expenditure and revenue types and a growth rate as well as a 
discount rate. Due to the delay of internationally comparable statistics, we choose the year 
2002 as our base year. Therefore all numbers and values are in present value terms of the 
year 2002 if not stated otherwise. Population projections are calculated with a 
demographic program developed by Bonin (2001).
3
2.2.1   France 
Base year’s population as well as the age and sex structure of international migrants are 
taken from the website of the federal statistical office in France (INSEE). Age-specific 
mortality and fertility rates can be received upon request from INSEE. The French 
population consisted of nearly 29.1 million men and 30.7 million women in 2002 with a life 
expectancy at birth of 75.8 and 82.9 years respectively. The total fertility rate (TFR) was 
around 1.8 children per woman. The projection is based on the assumptions of the 
“Scenario Central” of INSEE’s own projection published in Brutel (2001). According to these 
assumptions the life expectancy of men (women) will rise to 82.9 (91.0) years in 2050. The 
TFR is held constant and net immigration is 50,000 people p.a. Due to the infinite time 
horizon of Generational Accounting we hold these parameters constant from 2050 on. This 
leads to a population of 62.75 million in 2050 which differs only slightly from the INSEE 
approach (64 million). 
Aggregates for revenues and expenditures are taken from OECD (2004a, 2004b) and 
based on detailed statistics about tax and social contribution receipts as well as the 
government expenditures by function according to COFOG, the harmonised classification 
on the international level. Intergovernmental grants and transfers have been cancelled 
out. Revenues include taxes on labour and capital incomes, value added tax (VAT), excise 
taxes on insurance and tobacco, petrol, vehicle, other taxes and social insurance 
contributions. Expenditures encompass in expenses for general public services, defence, 
public order and safety, economic affairs and environmental protection, education, 
housing and cultural activities. The entry “Social Protection” is subdivided into eight more 
subcategories such as child and youth support or disability and invalidity benefits after 
                                                 
3 Bonin’s (2001) demographic program is based on the discrete and deterministic algebraic formulation of 
the component method proposed by Leslie (1945). The standard procedure has been extended to 
distinguish between genders and to incorporate immigration. Outcomes of the program are fairly 
comparable to official forecasts. See the countries’ sections (2.2.1-2.2.4) for details. 
  6OECD (2004a). Health expenditures on which this paper focuses are divided into six 
subcategories, namely the in- and outpatient sector, drug expenses, sick benefits and 
miscellaneous and administration expenditures. Altogether 34 entries of revenues and 
expenditures are distinguished. 
Entries like defence or homeland security which are not paid or consumed in an age-
specific way are distributed with a flat per capita profile. Except for the health and 
education sector age-specific micro-profiles are taken from Cérani and Camus (2004). 
Where applicable the profiles are sex-specific. The problem however is that these age-
specific profiles are reported in quite large age-groups. The education expense profile is 
calculated on the basis of the base year’s population and participation rates from OECD 
(2004c). The age- and sex-specific profiles for the six aggregates concerning health 
expenditures are from IRDES (2002).  
2.2.2   Germany 
Germany’s base year demographics are taken from Federal Statistical Office Germany 
(2003a) and by request from the Federal Statistical Office Germany. On January 1
st 2002, 
Germany had around 82.4 million inhabitants of which 40.3 million were male. Life 
expectancy at birth was 74.8 (80.8) years for men (women) and the TFR was around 1.4. The 
population projection used is based on the fifth variant of the tenth coordinated 
population projection of the Federal Statistical Office Germany (2003b). According to the 
assumptions, life expectancy will rise to 81.1 (86.6) years for men (women) over the next 
five decades and the TFR is held constant at its base year level. The net immigration lays 
around 220,000 p.a. and differs slightly from year to year. As in the case of France, all 
parameters are held constant after 2050. The difference in 2050 between the official and 
our projection is just 400,000 people. 
Aggregated revenues and expenditures are from national accounts data from the 
Federal Statistical Office Germany and available upon request. As in the case of France, 
intergovernmental grants and transfers have been cancelled out. The macro data is more 
detailed than in the case of any of the other analysed countries. It distinguishes between 
91 revenues and expenditures entries. These are all major taxes like VAT, income, wage and 
special taxes like tobacco, petrol or vehicle and the major social contributions like social 
security of health. The same can be applied for the expenditure side. Health expenditures 
are divided into seven subcategories, i.e. sick benefits, in- and outpatient treatments, 
drugs, dental expenses, medical facilities and treatments at health resorts.  
Again non age-specific revenues and expenditures like defence are distributed with a 
flat per capita profile. Social security profiles are taken from VDR (2003), while health 
expenditures profiles stem from BAV (2003). All other profiles are based on the Sample 
  7Survey of Income and Expenditure, which is conducted by the Federal Statistical Office 
Germany (2001).  
To calculate future revenues and expenditures it is assumed that (supplementary to 
the procedure described in section 3.1) people living in East Germany will reach the fiscal 
efficiency of their West German contemporaries during the next 40 years, and that 
medium- and long-term effects of currently decided reforms, especially those of the last 
pension and tax reforms, will actually be implemented. 
2.2.3   Switzerland 
The population data for Switzerland is taken from Swiss Federal Statistical Office (2004a) 
and by request from the Swiss Federal Statistical Office. The Swiss population contained of 
3.5 million male and 3.7 female inhabitants in 2002 with a life expectancy at birth of 77.2 
(men) and 82.8 (women) years respectively. The TFR was 1.4. For the projection we used 
the assumptions of the “Trend” scenario of the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (2004a). After 
this source, TFR will first decrease to a level of 1.2 in the next ten years while it stabilizes 
thereafter at around 1.5. The life expectancy of newborns will increase to 82.5 (87.5) years 
for men (women). Net immigration will be negative at around 9,000 people per year. Our 
results differ slightly from the official projection with a difference of 400,000 people in 
2060. 
Macro data is taken from Swiss Federal Statistical Office (2004a, 2004b). Our 
Generational Accounts for Switzerland are based on the work of Borgmann and 
Raffelhüschen (2001) which is why the classification of aggregates differs slightly 
compared to the other three cases. All non age-specific expenditures are aggregated in 
one entry called government consumption which is again distributed with a per capita 
profile. Altogether we distinguish between 31 revenues and expenditures. 
Intergovernmental flows are cancelled out as well. Health-related expenditures (i.e. 
subsidies for premiums) are treated as a single entry. 
Except for educational and health expenses all micro-profiles are from the Sample 
Survey of Income and Consumption 1998 (Swiss Federal Statistical Office (1998)). Profiles 
for education are taken from Ecoplan (2000) while age-specific health expenditures are 
received by request from the Swiss office for risk-clearing of the statutory health insurance. 
In our calculation we account for several reform steps of the public pension system 
with the tenth revision from 1998 as the last one. According to this reform status future 
benefits of the public pension system only grow with half of total productivity growth  .  g
  82.2.4   United States 
The base year U.S. population as well as the age and sex structure of international 
migrants, age-specific mortality and fertility rates and the assumptions for the projection 
are taken from the website of the U.S. Census Bureau. The U.S. population in 2002 
consisted of nearly 138 million men and 143 million women with a life expectancy at birth 
of 74.1 and 81.2 years respectively. The TFR was around 2.05 children per woman. The 
projection is based on the assumptions of the “Interim Projection” of the Census Bureau. 
According to these assumptions the life expectancy of men (women) will rise to 79.8 (86.7) 
years in 2050. The TFR increases slightly to 2.16 and net immigration is around one million 
people p.a. This leads to a population of 410 million in 2050 which again differs only 
slightly from the Census approach (420 million). 
Like in the case of France aggregates for revenues and expenditures are taken from 
OECD (2004a, 2004b) and are based on detailed statistics about tax and social contribution 
receipts as well as the government expenditures by function according to COFOG. 
Intergovernmental grants and transfers have been cancelled out. Revenues include taxes 
on labour and capital incomes, state sales taxes, and other taxes. Social insurance 
contributions have also been taken into account. Expenditures encompass expenses for 
general public services, defence, public order and safety, economic affairs and 
environmental protection, education, housing and cultural activities. The entry “Social 
Protection” is subdivided into eight more subcategories such as child and youth support or 
disability and invalidity benefits after OECD (2004a). Altogether 24 entries of revenues and 
expenditures are distinguished.  
Entries like defence or homeland security which are not paid or consumed in an age-
specific way are distributed with a per capita profile. Except for the health and education 
sector age-specific micro-profiles are taken from the Survey of Income and Program 
Participation (U.S. Census Bureau (2001)). Where applicable the profiles are sex-specific. 
The education expense profile is calculated on the basis of the base year’s population and 
participation rates from OECD (2004c). The age- and sex-specific profile for the health 
expenditures aggregate is from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services by request. 
2.2.5   Growth and Discount Rate 
Growth and discount rates are sensitive parameters in a Generational Accounting 
framework. For an infinite time horizon, any future projection of these parameters remains 
arbitrary. This is especially true in an international comparison because in such an analysis 
one does not only account for the fluctuation over time but for the variation of these 
parameters between the countries. However, as Aaron (1966) has shown, in such an 
analysis as ours the quantitative level of the results is only affected by the difference 
  9between the real growth and the real interest rate and not by their levels. So we employ a 
growth rate of 1.5 per cent p. a. and a discount rate of 3 per cent p.a. (i.e. a difference of 1.5 
percentage points). This is a reasonable compromise amongst the comparability of our 
results between the countries and the observations of these parameters in the past. The 
growth rates of the countries analysed were lying between 0.9 (Switzerland) and 2 per cent 
p.a. within the last three decades. A reasonable range of interest rate assumptions is 
determined by the fact that public receipts and expenditures are significantly more 
uncertain than non-risky long-term government bonds on the one hand, but not as 
volatile as the return on risky assets on the other hand. Accordingly, the discount rate 
chosen should range between the average rates of return on these types of assets. In the 
light of this argument, we have opted for a standard discount rate of 3 per cent p.a. 
Nevertheless, sensitivity tests are necessary to cope with the empirical uncertainty 
affecting this generational accounting parameter. Such tests are provided in the appendix. 
2.2.6   Accounting for the medical-technical progress 
The so called Newhouse conjecture identifies the medical-technical progress as a major 
driver of rising health care expenditures besides income (Newhouse 1992). The health 
economics literature has shown that the Newhouse conjecture is true for most of the OECD 
countries (see for example Gelijns und Rosenberg (1994) and Okunade and Murthy (2002)). 
Unfortunately there are as yet to our knowledge only a few studies quantifying the effect 
of the medical-technical progress on the growth of public health care expenditures.
4 Due 
to this lack on data for all countries we consider two scenarios for our following analysis: 
The first one does not account for medical-technical progress or other reasons for higher 
growth of real per capita health expenditures. Instead, real per capita health expenditures 
develops with the same real growth rate as the economy’s real GDP per capita. The second 
scenario assumes a one percentage point medium-term higher growth of per capita health 
expenditures than the real growth rate of the certain economy. Thus, the second scenario 
accounts for possible rising costs in the health sector due to the medical-technical 
progress or to other reasons. Furthermore, with a rising standard of living it is not 
unrealistic to expect that also the scope of benefits of the public health insurance will 
extend due to the fact that health could be seen as a “luxury good”, i.e. the income 
elasticity of health goods is greater than one.
5
                                                 
4  Hagist and Kotlikoff (2005) calculate the growth of health expenditures per recipient for ten OECD 
countries, inter alia for Germany and the U.S. For the U.S. they find an impact of 2.6 percentage points for the 
U.S. and 1.7 percentage points for Germany due to the medical-technical progress. Breyer and Ulrich (2000) 
numeralize the effect with one percentage point for Germany. 
5  For a discussion and an overview about several studies concerning income elasticities of health care 
expenditures, see Roberts (1999). 
  10For reasons of simplification we choose a duration of 40 years for the impact of the 
medical-technical progress with a (conservative placed) volume of one percentage point.
6 
We are aware of the fact that this scenario is completely arbitrary, especially in its duration. 
The only aim of this exercise is to show how devastating the impact of the medical-
technical progress for the fiscal sustainability can be and so every approximately realistic 
scenario is useful in this sense. In the following analyses SQ (“status quo”) always indicates 
the basic scenario which does not consider any (expenditures) growth-accelerating 
progress in the health sector. MTP (“medical-technical progress”) indicates the scenario 
accounting for higher growth rates in the health sector due to the technical development. 
 
3.   Social Health Insurance in France, Germany, Switzerland and 
the U.S. 
In all of the four countries analysed, health care expenditures make up for a significant 
proportion of the gross domestic products (GDP). As one can see from figure 1, for 
Germany, Switzerland and the U.S. this fraction is even bigger than ten per cent. Except for 
the U.S., public health expenditures i.e. expenses of social health insurance schemes are 
responsible for more than 50 per cent of the certain level. But also in the U.S. the health 
sector is quite large. Even though the U.S. have no universal statutory coverage as many 
European countries (e.g. France or Switzerland) do, public health care expenditures per 
capita is among the highest in the OECD countries.
7 However, the comparability of 
international data about national health care expenditures is difficult since the scope of 
benefits widely differs and a precise definition of the category “Public Health Expenditures” 
is still missing.
8
This section briefly describes the four different social health insurance schemes and 
discusses their important properties out of a public financial perspective. Furthermore we 
sketch current reform proposals for the public health insurance systems and present 
Generational Accounts and first findings of our sustainability analysis. 
                                                 
6 An impact of one percentage point is also used in the projections by the Medicare trustees, see Snow et 
al. (2005). 
7 See OECD (2004a). 
8 See also OECD (2004a). So are in some states long-term care benefits included in the expenditures of 
Medicaid, while in France these are benefits of a special social security program. This bias remains in our 
further analysis as it is hard to come by. 
  11Figure 1: Public vs. Private Health Expenditures as percentage of GDP in selected 
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3.1 France 
The history of the French social health insurance is long and controversy and so is the 
system itself. Influenced by the Bismarckian model after the first and the British Beveridge 
system after the Second World War, the French system can be seen as a mixture of the 
Britain and German approach. 
3.1.1   The French Social Health Insurance System 
The French health insurance scheme is a universal health insurance, hence only with a few 
exceptions every citizen is covered. In principle the system is organized as an omnium 
insurance. Sickness funds (“Caisses”) are structured around certain socio-economic groups 
(like workers) and are not competing with each other. Most hospitals act as an entity of 
their own but are state-controlled. Furthermore government intervention in the market for 
pharmaceuticals is quite common. Outpatient practitioners are self-employed but have to 
negotiate prices with government agencies.
9 For the major part of the population the 
French system is organized on the principle of cost-reimbursement with – for a social 
health insurance – relatively high co-payments. However, these co-payments are usually 
reinsured by specialized statutory sickness funds. 
                                                 
9 For a detailed description of the French health care system see Lepperhoff (2004).  
  12The budget is mainly financed by contributions of employers and employees and by a 
special tax known as CGS (“Contribution Sociale Généralisée”). Beyond this, funds are taken 
from the general tax revenue. For 2004 the primary deficit of the French health insurance 
scheme is estimated with 13 billion Euros which adds up to over 33 billion Euros of debt.
10
In 2003 the former Prime Minister Raffarin alongside his secretary of state for health, 
Douste-Blazy, presented a reform proposal to cut back the deficits and to restore fiscal 
sustainability. In the summer of 2004 this reform proposal became law although many 
experts and the administration of the health insurance (CNAM) believed that even with the 
measures of the new law deficits will occur again in 2007 in the latest. The two major 
instruments of the reform are an electronic patient dossier (“Dossier Médical Personnel”) 
and the fortification of the gate-keeping functions of general practitioners. Furthermore 
the use of generic drugs is promoted and the administration especially in hospitals is 
reformed. Altogether the government estimated to save around 10 billion Euros with these 
measures. On the revenue side the CSG is augmented to more types of income and a 
deductible of one Euro per outpatient appointment is introduced. Together with more 
transfers coming from the revenue of the tobacco tax, the government planned with five 
billion Euros more of revenue for the social health insurance system.
11
3.1.2  Generational Accounts and Sustainability Gap 
Figure 2 shows the Generational Accounts for the French public sector. In line of our 
definition in subsection 2.2.6, the “SQ” (Status quo) scenario indicates only the 
consequences for the fiscal sustainability caused by the demographic development of the 
French population. “MTP” refers to the scenario where health expenditures growth in the 
middle run is higher than total factor productivity. Both scenarios include the measures 
from the above described Raffarin reform as far as estimates were available.
12
                                                 
10 See Wagner and Crevel (2004). 
11 Note that in a Generational Accounting framework the distribution of the revenue of a certain tax does not 
matter since for the general government including social security such measures are just labeling. For a 
detailed discussion of the Raffarin reform, see for example Wagner and Crevel (2004) or Cornilleau and 
Ventelou (2004). 
12 We use the official government estimates reported in Wagner and Crevel (2004). 
  13Figure 2: Generational Accounts of the French Public Sector


























SQ Scenario MTP Scenario  
The Generational Accounts displayed in figure 2 show the typical pattern in both 
scenarios. In the SQ scenario until the cohort of nine-year-olds the representative of every 
cohort receives more transfers/benefits over his/her life cycle from the French central 
government than he/she will pay taxes/contributions. The ten-year-olds cohort already 
pays a little bit more than he/she receives and this amount of net taxes augments to 
192,520 Euros for the generation of 25-year-olds. After that the net payments are shrinking 
and all generations older than 48 are net beneficiaries whereas the average person aged 
66 receives the maximum net benefit in the amount of 163,970 Euros.
13 If we account for 
the medical-technical progress (MTP) the maximum net payment is reduced to 164,020 
Euros and now made by the generation of 26-year-olds. Still the representative 66-year-old 
is the main beneficiary but now with 172,060 Euros. Qualitatively the pattern remains the 
same. 
As a thought experiment it is also possible to calculate Generational Accounts isolated 
for the French Social Health Insurance System. In the case of France, this surely contradicts 
the purpose of Generational Accounting in the way the originators set up this instrument 
to avoid the labelling aspect of government finances.
14 The problem is that the revenues of 
the French health care system are only in part well-defined and in part a share of the 
overall tax revenue. So any assignment of revenues for the sub-system social health 
                                                 
13  Note that all contributions these generations paid in the past are unconsidered since Generational 
Accounting is straight forward looking. One has to keep in mind that for this reason the Generational 
Accounts between living generations are not comparable. 
14 See FN 11 and Kotlikoff (2002) for the point of labelling.  
  14insurance is just labelling and thus arbitrary. However, as a thought experiment and for 
policy recommendations, such labelling can be quite interesting and useful to obtain a 
benchmark. This is why we also calculate Generational Accounts isolated for the French 
social health insurance scheme.
15 To get this isolation we assume a balanced budget for 
the subsystem in the base year.
16 Figure 3 shows the pattern of the isolated Generational 
Accounts. 
Figure 3: Generational Accounts of the French Social Health Insurance Scheme

























SQ Scenario MTP Scenario  
As one can see the picture in this case is quite different than the Generational 
Accounts of the overall fiscal system. Without accounting for the medical-technical 
progress (SQ) the cohorts between 5 and 38 years are net contributors to the system but all 
other generations are net beneficiaries. Also levels between net payments and net 
transfers show quite a discrepancy. This clearly shows why the system is already in financial 
trouble (i.e. with annual deficits of 10 billion Euros and more) and – with an ageing society 
– will be in the future. If we account for the medical-technical progress (MTP), the fiscal 
situation of the French social health insurance becomes completely absurd because 
everybody is over his/her life cycle a net beneficiary. In this case the whole burden falls on 
future generations. 
How large this burden quantitatively is can be computed by using equation (6), the 
intertemporal public liabilities. The intertemporal public liabilities are nothing else than 
                                                 
15 We assigned the revenues according to the official numbers from the French Ministry of Health which are 
available under http://www.assurancemaladie.sante.gouv.fr.  
16 This assumption applies also for the other three countries and their isolated health insurance systems. The 
assumption of balanced budgets in the base year is again arbitrary (in the sense of Generational Accounting) 
and only made for reasons of comparison. 
  15the negative present value of all future net taxes paid by all living and future generations. 
This present value can be derived by summing up the cohort’s net transfers and payments 
weighted with the amount of people in the specific cohort for all living and future 
generations. It states the overall “implicit” deficit of a fiscal system, here the amount of 
money the French public sector (the French social health insurance) would need to be 
inter-generationally balanced. In the SQ scenario of the public fiscal situation, the 
intertemporal public liabilities amount to 4,476 billion Euros. Dividing this value by the 
French base year GDP of 1,582 billion Euros yields the value for our indicator sustainability 
gap which amounts to 294.3 per cent of GDP. The health sector is responsible for about 
55.2 percentage points of this amount without accounting for any medical-technical 
progress. Another 59.1 percentage points are caused by the external debt in the base year 
and the resulting 180 percentage points are due to other social obligations or pay-as-you-
go systems like public pensions.
17 Considering the MTP scenario the health care related 
share goes up by about 190.5 percentage points to 245.7 per cent of GDP. Now, the health 
sector would be responsible for over the half of the overall sustainability gap of 484.8 per 
cent of GDP. As one can see the leverage of the medical-technical progress and its cost 
driving property is one of the major forces behind the French unsustainable public 
finances. 
Former studies of the sustainability of the French fiscal policy conclude the same 
qualitative results as our analysis. The quantitative results between our study and the work 
of Bonnet (2002), Crettez, Feist und Raffelhüschen (1999) and Accardo (1998) however 
differ quite substantially. The discrepancy can be explained by differences of the base 
years and different assumptions over the growth and discount rate spreads and the 
development of the French population. We provide a sensitivity analysis of our indicators 
in the appendix where one can see that especially the sustainability reacts quite sensitive 




3.2.1   The German Social Health Insurance System 
Since its implementation by Bismarck in 1883 the German statutory health insurance has 
seen major changes but it still is a classic social insurance in the Bismarckian sense. 
Initiated originally only for workers, it now covers over 85 per cent of the German 
                                                 
17 Again, this breakdown is only a benchmark approach since the assignment of revenues for the health 
insurance system remains arbitrary. 
  16population.
18 Excluded are only self-employed and public servants while employees with 
an income over a certain ceiling have the right to opt-out of the otherwise mandatory 
system.
19 Contributions are with some minor exceptions for retirees only wage-based (i.e. 
capital and other incomes are not included) and paid to one of over 250 statutory sickness 
funds. Since the mid-nineties these sickness funds are competing with each other 
especially over the contribution rate. Non-working spouses and children are free and 
covered over the contributions of the working family members. To account for different 
risks in the portfolio of sickness funds, a risk-clearing mechanism (RSA) was introduced in 
the mid-nineties. Around 75 per cent of Germany’s hospitals are state-controlled (most 
times in municipal hands) but act as independent entities. Prices for pharmaceuticals paid 
by the sickness funds are negotiated with government agencies as are prices for 
outpatient care. Practitioners are private entities but mandatory members of their business 
chamber (“Kassenärztliche Vereinigung”) with which the government carries the 
negotiations. The catalogue of benefits is very wide and includes such items as treatments 
at health resorts or classes for new mothers. The system is based on the principle of 
benefits in kind so the patient has only a very limited cost-controlling function. From the 
international view only minor deductibles for drugs, out- and inpatient care as well as 
dental prostheses have to be paid.
20
The budget for 2004 enfolded around 144 billion Euros. Since the latest reform act 
(“GKV-Modernisierungsgesetz”) which was introduced in 2004 contributions are not longer 
the exclusive pillar of financing. Additional to the contributions, a certain amount of the 
tobacco tax is distributed to the system as well. This pillar makes up around 4 of the 144 
billion Euros. 
In the ongoing discussion about a sustainable reform of the German health insurance, 
two new financing concepts evolved out of the political spectrum. On the one side the 
Social Democrats and the Greens want to establish a so called citizens’ insurance 
(“Bürgerversicherung”), that is universal coverage and means that the socio-economic 
groups mentioned above who today are insured by private carriers, would become part of 
the statutory system. Hence the German system would be really universal like in Britain or 
Sweden. Furthermore this proposal wants to include more types of income such as capital 
gains or rents. A more rigorous way to get rid of the wage-based contributions is 
envisioned by the Christian Democrats who are planning to establish a lump-sum 
                                                 
18 Strictly spoken Germany has no universal health insurance system. However, before 2005, on top of the 85 
per cent five per cent are covered directly by the government (disabled people, police and fire men, etc.). 
Furthermore, the major part of private premiums for public servants is paid by the government as well so 
that really only a little minority cares for themselves privately. 
19 This feature is – with the notable exception of Chile – unique in the industrialized world. 
20 A detailed description of the German system can be found in Lepperhoff (2004) or Kamke (1998). 
  17premium system alike in Switzerland (see below in 3.3). The social redistribution should 
then be made by the tax system and not any longer by the health insurance itself. Both 
reform proposals are intensively discussed and part of the current election campaign.
21
3.2.2   Generational Accounts and Sustainability Gap 
Figure 4 shows the Generational Accounts for the German public sector for both of our 
scenarios. Quantitatively the pattern is the same as in the case of France but the level of 
the Generational Accounts are quite different. The average person aged 26 in the base year 
remits 104,160 (80,030) Euros over his remaining life cycle in the SQ (MTP) scenario (which 
makes him/her the maxim net payer) while his French counterpart pays 192,470 (164,020) 
Euro. On the other side the maximum beneficiary, the cohort of 63-year-olds, receives 
246,700 (255,000) Euros. Compared to his/her French counterpart, he/she gets 92,700 
(91,360) Euros more. So Germans pay less and receive more than their French neighbours 
over their remaining life cycle.  
Figure 4: Generational Accounts of the German Public Sector



























SQ Scenario MTP Scenario  
Until 2004 an isolated analysis with Generational Accounts of the German health 
insurance was possible without any flaws whatsoever because the finances of the sickness 
funds were an off-budget authority where the central government had only a supervising 
function. With the reform of 2004, this parafiscal enterprise was opened up and a certain 
amount of revenues out of the tobacco tax are injected into the risk-clearing system and so 
distributed to the sickness funds. In terms of Generational Accounting we have now the 
                                                 
21  For a detailed description of both proposals and a sustainability analysis see Fetzer, Hagist and 
  18same labelling problem as in the case of France, however, in the German circumstance, the 
problem is rather minor because the tax-financed part makes only about three per cent of 
total revenues of the health insurance scheme. The isolated Generational Accounts are 
shown in figure 5: 
Figure 5: Generational Accounts of the German Social Health Insurance Scheme
























SQ Scenario MTP Scenario  
The cohorts that are net payers do not remit as much as do their French counterparts 
but all beneficiary cohorts are getting less than their comparable French equivalents. This 
can also be seen in the sustainability gaps. With an explicit debt of 60.8 per cent of GDP in 
2002 the sustainability gap in the SQ case is 316.9 per cent of GDP.
22 66.8 percentage 
points of this value are caused by the social health insurance scheme if not accounted for 
any medical-technical progress. This number rises to 206.2 percentage points in the MTP 
scenario. The overall burden in the MTP case is 456.4 per cent of GDP. Again, these results 
differ with the assumptions of the discount and growth rates spread. Results of the 
sensitivity analysis can be found in the appendix. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                          
Raffelhüschen (2004). 
22 The difference to the results in Benz and Fetzer (2004) is due to the fact that we included the measures of 
the latest reform act GMG (GKV-Modernisierungsgesetz) in our analysis. For a detailed discussion of the GMG 
and its implications for the sustainability of the German system, see Fetzer and Hagist (2004). 
  193.3 Switzerland 
3.3.1   The Swiss Social Health Insurance System 
The Swiss health insurance system is a very new and modern one. The current system was 
introduced in 1994 and combines the two reform proposals discussed in Germany. The 
insurance is mandatory for every citizen (as in the proposal of the citizens’ insurance) but 
financed with lump-sum premiums (like in the other proposal). Swiss citizens can choose 
between 92 competing statutory sickness funds for a basic health insurance package. The 
premiums are unisex and not age-specific and differ from sickness fund to sickness fund 
and also by region. For the poor the government subsidises the premiums. As in Germany 
the system has a risk-clearing mechanism which tries to balance the risks between the 
certain statutory sickness funds. Around two thirds of hospitals are state-controlled and 
negotiate like practitioners the prices of their services with the business chamber of the 
sickness funds. The government controls prices of drugs using a range related to prices in 
other OECD countries and by a list with around 7700 certified drugs which are eligible for 
the basic health insurance package. The Swiss system relies more heavily on personal cost 
involvement than France or Germany. The deductible for every adult is at least 300 CHF 
p.a. with a following relative co-payment of usually 10 per cent up to 700 CHF p.a.
23
Although the system is very new and modern, it has until now no impact on costs 
which are constantly rising faster than GDP. One of the most criticised features of the Swiss 
system is the obligation to contract between the sickness funds and the care providers. 
Especially in the inpatient sector the competition has to be increased. 
For our analysis of the Swiss health insurance scheme we have to make another 
assumption concerning the accounting for the medical-technical progress that differs of 
the one made for the other countries in our analysis. In the Swiss national accounts on 
which we base our aggregates no health related entries except some minor expenditures 
for investments in the infrastructure and the subsidies of the premiums occur. As there are 
no benefits paid by the government we assume that the cost pressure of the medical-
technical progress will push the amount of subsidies one-to-one. This is not an unrealistic 
scenario given that the premiums have to rise with the augmentation of the expenditures 




                                                 
23  A detailed description of the Swiss health insurance scheme can be found in Baur, Heimer and 
Wieseler (2001). 
  203.3.2  Generational Accounts and Sustainability Gap 
The Swiss Generational Accounts plotted in figure 6 look more like their French than their 
German counterparts. Young generations except the ones very close to their birth have to 
pay a relatively high amount of net taxes over their remaining life cycle. Like in the German 
case it is the cohort of 26-year-olds who has to remit the maximum net payment of 
292,800 CHF in the SQ scenario and 249,710 CHF respectively in the MTP case. The main 
beneficiary generation is the 66 years old which receives 360,190 CHF over their remaining 
life cycle in the SQ scenario and 373,860 CHF if we account for the medical-technical 
progress (MTP). 
Figure 6: Generational Accounts of the Swiss Public Sector
























SQ Scenario MTP Scenario  
Since the tenth revision of the Swiss public pension system AHV which ceiled the 
growth of benefits to the half of the growth of wages
24, the social health insurance scheme 
looks like the most urgent candidate for reform out of a public finance perspective. Figure 
7 underlines that point.
25 Even in the SQ scenario where only the demographic 
development is accounted for all generations are net beneficiaries. Accounting for the 
medical-technical progress all generations except the ones close to death receive about 
50,000 CHF in net benefits over their remaining life cycle.  
                                                 
24  For a detailed discussion about the public pension reforms in Switzerland and their analysis with 
Generational Accounts, see Borgmann and Raffelhüschen (2001). 
25 Again this can only be considered as a thought experiment since the distribution of revenues for the health 
care system remains unclear. 
  21Figure 7: Generational Accounts of the Swiss Social Health Insurance Scheme





















SQ Scenario MTP Scenario  
That the health insurance scheme is really where the shoe will pinch for the next 
decades is also shown by the sustainability gap for Switzerland. The value of the 
sustainability gap for the whole public sector is in the SQ scenario 64.4 per cent of GDP 
which is very close to the 54.5 per cent of GDP of external debt reported for 2002. One 
could say that there is no problem with the Swiss public finances because the implicit debt 
is near zero. The problem is that this nearly sustainable situation is only caused by the 
reform of the public pension system and does not deal for example with the cost-
accelerating medical-technical progress. The isolated sustainability gap of the Swiss health 
insurance alone is 36.5 per cent of GDP, so without any health insurance the Swiss would 
have an implicit property of 26.6 per cent of GDP. The health sector is quasi-subsidised by 
all other public systems. If one accounts for the medical- technical progress this subsidy is 
not sufficient any more and Switzerland would have a sustainability gap of about 173.8 per 
cent of which 145.9 percentage points are caused by the health sector. 
Our results stand in line with those of Borgmann and Raffelhüschen (2001) which are 
the only studies with a Generational Accounting framework for Switzerland to our 
knowledge.  
  223.4 U.S. 
3.4.1   The U.S. Social Health Insurance System 
The U.S. is the only country in our sample that has no generalized universal social health 
insurance or tax funded system.
26 Instead, the U.S. has basically two public programs which 
could be seen as social health insurance for certain socio-economic groups: Medicare and 
Medicaid. While the first one is a federal program and only eligible for seniors over 65 years 
and disabled persons, the later is run by the states and concentrates on households with 
an income under a certain threshold. The rest of the population has to buy private 
insurance plans, or stay uninsured as do around 40 to 45 million Americans. Medicare is 
mainly financed through contributions from employers and employees while Medicaid is 
tax-funded. All market participants i.e. hospitals, practitioners and drug companies are free 
agents with no direct government intervention in their price negotiations. Deductibles for 
services only have to be paid by Medicare beneficiaries up to certain ceilings which are 
regularly adjusted.
27
A big issue of both U.S. public health schemes is the scope of benefits. For Medicaid, 
the minimum coverage is in- and outpatient medical tests and treatments and certain 
qualified nursing services. Each state administration can choose to extend these benefits 
to dental care, prescription drugs or physical therapy for instance. In the compulsory part 
of Medicare (Part A) the covered services range from in- to outpatient treatments and – 
beginning in 2006 – also prescription drugs.
28
Current reform proposals are primarily concentrating on Medicaid because rising 
health care expenditures in this program not only burden the federal but drive the state’s 
budgets in red ink which do not have many room for manoeuvre. Medicaid spending 
driven by a 40 per cent increase in caseloads and accelerating prices in the health sector 
has risen dramatically in the last 20 years. To cut costs, the National Governors Association 
(2005) wants to introduce an augmented level of price intervention in the market for 
prescription drugs, market forces in form of deductible or co-payments and more flexible 
benefits packages. Medicare reform – although still necessary as this study will show – 
does not seem to be on top of the political agenda after the Medicare Modernization Act of 
2003. 
                                                 
26 As we have shown in FN 18, Germany’s system is very close to an universal character. 
27 For a broad overview about the U.S. health care system see Baur, Heimer and Wieseler (2001). The basics of 
Medicaid are described in detail in Iglehart (1999a) while details about Medicare can be found in 
Iglehart (1999b). 
28 This enlargement of the scope of benefits is the core part of the Medicare Modernization Act which passed 
Congress in 2003. The estimated costs for this augmentation are around 395 billion US $ over the next ten 
  233.4.2  Generational Accounts and Sustainability Gap 
In certain American tabloids France and Germany are willingly referred to as welfare states 
with ageing societies not able to serve as a role model for the U.S. Certainly the U.S. has a 
different demographic development than Germany and France thanks to its relatively high 
birth rate and its high immigration. But caused by the increasing life expectancy the U.S. 
society is getting older in average. Especially when the so called baby boomer generations 
will hit their retirement and enjoy the benefits of public programs like Medicare, the U.S. 
will also have features of a welfare state. This can also be seen in figure 8, the Generational 
Accounts of the U.S. general government finances. While the maximum net payer with 
104,430 US $ in the SQ and 35,840 US $ in the MTP scenario is much younger in both 
scenarios than in the other analysed countries (22 years), the age of the main beneficiary 
(282,910 US $ and 312,230 US $) is with 66 (SQ) and 65 (MTP) the same.  
Figure 8: Generational Accounts of the U.S. Public Sector



























SQ Scenario MTP Scenario  
Like in the case of Switzerland the health sector makes up one of the biggest parts of 
all transfers and clearly causes the picture in figure 8. In both scenarios every cohort is a net 
beneficiary (figure 9). Thus, spoken in average terms, contributions to the public health 
care systems Medicare and Medicaid stays in no relation to the benefits of the systems. 
Consequently, the more private character of the overall health system in the U.S. does not 
protect from unsustainable finances caused by the health sector. 
                                                                                                                                                         
years which we will include in our Generational Accounting framework. See Congressional Budget Office 
(2004) for details. 
  24Figure 9: Generational Accounts of the U.S. Social Health Insurance Scheme























SQ Scenario MTP Scenario  
This fact is also reflected in the sustainability gap of the U.S. public sector. In the SQ 
scenario the U.S. has an intertemporal debt of 656.6 per cent of the base year’s GDP of 
which 355.7 percentage points are caused by the health programs. The amount of health 
related debt more than doubles if we account for the medical-technical progress to 840.2 
per cent of GDP which leads to an overall sustainability gap of 1,141.1 per cent of GDP. Out 
of this perspective it can be said with clear conscience that not Social Security but 
Medicare and Medicaid are the ticking time bombs of the U.S. fiscal policy. 
Other authors come to the same conclusion in recent studies. Auerbach, Gale and 
Orszag (2004) estimate a so called “fiscal gap” between 65.2 and 85.5 trillion US $ which 
comes close to our intertemporal public liabilities between 68.5 and 119 trillion US $.
29 
Gokhale and Smetters (2003) calculate a 36.6 trillion “fiscal imbalance” for Medicare only.
30 
Both studies make assumptions about the growth-enhancing property of the medical-
technical progress which are similar to our MTP scenario.  
 
                                                 
29 The discount rate used for the calculations in Auerbach, Gale and Orszag (2004) is higher than ours. They 
use a nominal discount rate of 5.8 per cent while we use a real interest rate of 3 per cent. 
30 Gokhale and Smetters (2003) use a growth-interest-spread of 1.9 percentage points (g=1.7 per cent and r = 
3 per cent). 
  254.     Who’s going broke? 
4.1  Indicators and Analysis 
Figure 10 shows again the sustainability gaps for the four countries in the SQ case, 
identifying how much the health sector is responsible for.
31 In all countries analysed health 
expenditures make up a major part of future deficits. According to the comparison of this 
indicator, the U.S. faces the biggest fiscal challenge followed by Germany. Medicare and 
Medicaid are the biggest cause for unsustainable public finances of the U.S. and are 
responsible for over the half of its long-term (intertemporal) liabilities. Germany and France 
are playing in the same league with a sustainability gap of about three times their GDP. 
Here, in the SQ scenario, health is only responsible for between 16 and 20 per cent of the 
overall liabilities. Switzerland’s only problems in terms of fiscal policy seem to be its 
external debt and the health sector. According to our results, all other systems of social 
security generate an implicit property of 26.6 per cent of GDP which only the health sector 
is eating up. 
Figure 10: Sustainability gaps of the four countries and shares of public 
health insurance systems
Base year 2002, r=3%, g=1,5%










































Explicit debt Implicit debt due to the remaining fiscal system Implicit debt due to the social health insurance scheme SG
 
However, there are flaws in this analysis, especially if you compare between the 
countries which is our stated goal. For an international comparison the sustainability gap 
might not be appropriate for several reasons. Firstly, it is an indicator which reacts wildly 
                                                 
31 The same graph for the MTP scenario can be found as figure 11 in the appendix. 
  26for changes of the parameters growth and discount rate or more precisely to the growth 
and discount spread as Aaron (1966) has shown. As we have already discussed in 
subsection 2.2.5 these spreads could differ between the countries, whereas we opted for a 
standard setting for reasons of comparison. Secondly, all of the four countries have 
different demographic developments which will determine their future economic power 
and so their ability to pay their debts. With a growing population, the economic power of 
the U.S. will rise and so will GDP in the future while the German population will shrink not 
only in size but even more in its workforce which co-determines GDP. An appropriate 
indicator for an international comparison should take these facts into account. The ratio 
between a dynamic value such as the intertemporal public liabilities and a static value such 
as base year’s GDP does not perform well in this matter.
32
Our second indicator, the future generations’ burden, at least overcomes the second 
flaw of the sustainability gap. Now two dynamic values, the intertemporal public liabilities 
and the number of people in future generations, are set in proportion to each other. This 
ratio accounts for the differences in the demographic development. Table 1 shows the 
results for the future generations’ burden for our different scenarios and countries. 
 
 
Table 1: Future generations’ burden as share of GDP per capita in 2002 





















0.84 1.15  0.65  2.21  3.70 3.53  2.57  5.21 
 
As one can see, the analysis with the sustainability gap has to be relativised. Due to its 
demographic development, Germany burdens its future citizens with the highest debt in 
the SQ scenario. Every newborn after 2002 would have to bring 139,200 Euros with them 
to stabilize the current fiscal policy. Secondly France comes with over four times its GDP 
per capita of 2002, followed by the U.S. As its sustainability gap already hinted, Swiss future 
generations face only a relatively minor burden of 68,800 CHF. The biggest part of these 
                                                 
32 We think that the sustainability gap for one country alone and for political work is a valuable indicator 
since it is easy to understand and related to other fiscal indicators like the debt quota.  
  2768,800 CHF is from the secured explicit debt and is so already recognized in the political 
progress and by financial markets. 
In an analysis of the isolated health sector, the four countries can be separated into 
two different groups. In both Germany and France the health sector is in the SQ scenario 
responsible of about a fifth of the overall future generations’ burden. In Switzerland and 
the U.S. it is about one half. Other systems than health like public pensions seem to play a 
bigger role in France and Germany than in the other two countries. This is remarkable 
given that the scope of benefits in France and Germany are wider and co-payments and 
deductibles smaller than in Switzerland and the U.S.  
These ratios obviously change if one accounts for the medical-technical progress and 
its cost-accelerating properties. All future generations then face a burden of over seven 
times the GDP per capita of 2002 except the Swiss one. Health is now the major driver 
behind unsustainable public finances in all countries. 
Again the problem with the indicator future generations’ burden is that it is, like the 
sustainability gap, very volatile to changes of the growth-discount-spread. That is why we 
report two more indicators, the so called revenue and transfer gap, which are both very 
well comparable between the countries because they are sensible to the different 
demographic developments and so on the differences in future economic power and 
because they are not sensitive to changes of the growth and discount rate. The revenue 
gap states how taxes and duties would have to rise immediately for living and future 
generations to bring the current fiscal policy right on a sustainable track. Analogous, the 
transfer gap reports the proportion of which benefits and statutory transfers would have to 
be cut back immediately to reach a sustainable level. Results for both indicators and both 




                                                 
33 As one can see on the initial transfer quotas for the isolated health sector, our definition of public health 
expenditures differ from the one of the OECD illustrated in figure 1. Again, this remains a problem unsolved 
as obviously the OECD (our data for France and the U.S. is based on OECD (2004b)) itself has different 
approaches to define public health expenditures. 
  28 
Table 2: Revenue and Transfer Gaps (Tax and Transfer Quotas in per cent of GDP) 
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Both indicators show that relatively spoken the U.S. faces the biggest demographic 
challenge, not only because of its demographic development but rather due to the design 
of its social system. In the SQ scenario, revenues must rise about 21.8 per cent of their 
current level which would lead to a new tax quota of 39.6 per cent of GDP (compared to 
32.5 without this uprating).
34 In the MTP scenario a tax quota of 44.8 per cent would be 
reached and the taxes and contributions for Medicare and Medicaid alone would have to 
be doubled. Transfer cuts turn out not to be as large as revenue increases because of their 
demographic profile. While taxes and duties are mostly paid by the working generations, 
the transfers are mainly received by the elderly to whom the so called baby boomer 
generations will also belong in a few years. Due to this demographic leverage effect, 
transfer cuts do not have to be as large as revenue increases. Still, in an isolated analysis of 
the health care system, both programs, Medicare and Medicaid, would have to cut half of 
their benefits to reach a sustainable situation, at least in the health sector. 
                                                 
34 This demonstrates also why the results of the revenue and transfer gap have to be seen in a relative way 
because Germany and France have already tax quotas of 45.0 and 50.4 per cent of GDP respectively without 
any augmentation of the tax level. Switzerland has a tax quota of 37.7 per cent. For large and middle-sized 
economic powers like the U.S., Germany and France such rises in the level of taxation would also probably 
result in changes in relative factor prices (depending on which taxes would be increased). Generational 
Accounting cannot catch these effects. For a small open economy like Switzerland, factor prices would 
probably not change and so our results could be taken as given. For an analysis of Generational Accounting 
in General Equilibrium, see Fehr and Kotlikoff (1996) and Raffelhüschen and Risa (1997). 
  29Germany comes in second with revenue increases ranging from 14.1 (SQ) to 20.3. Tax 
quotas would than be between 51.3 and 54.1 per cent of GDP. Again, transfer cuts would 
not have to be as large as the tax changes but the difference between revenue increases 
and transfer cuts is not as large as in case of the U.S. This is due to the universal character of 
the German system where the demographic leverage effect is not quite as dominant as in 
case of the U.S. France with already the highest tax quota of 50.4 would have to rise that 
level to over 55.5 (SQ) and 58.8 (MTP) per cent of GDP respectively. Switzerland remains in 
its relative sustainable position, but one can see that – if something at all – it is also the 
health system where the shoe pinches. 
 
4.2 Discussion 
How can the devastating effects of the current health policies and the differences 
between the countries be explained? One driver is clearly the demographic development. 
All analysed countries will become “older” on average over the next five decades but with 
differences in the level. Germany and France are already relatively “old” with age 
dependency ratios of 20.57 and 19.57 respectively, followed by Switzerland with 18.47.
35 
The U.S. is still a “young” country with an age dependency ratio of 14.2. Nevertheless, as in 
all other countries, this value will be nearly doubled over the next decades and peak at 
around 28.0. As our work has shown, ageing has a cost-increasing effect and destabilizes 
public finances also in other areas than health (see the SQ scenario). However factors like 
the medical-technical progress and other cost-increasing effects are certainly equal or 
even more important. Especially the U.S. has a problem with the current health policy 
compared to Germany, France and Switzerland. One explanation for this could be price-
differences for medical goods and services. Anderson et al. (2003) have shown that in the 
U.S. health care market much higher prices are paid than in other OECD countries. They 
give a few possible explanations for this phenomenon: Firstly, relatively immobile factor 
prices (e.g. wages) could be higher than in other countries.
36 Secondly, the lacking 
monopsy power of universal public health insurance systems could as well lead to higher 
relative prices. 
However, also with a universal health insurance system the problem of unsustainable 
public finances is not solved as show the cases of Germany, France and Switzerland. 
Reform proposals that would really work have to include more market forces into the 
                                                 
35 The age dependency ratio in this case is defined as the ratio between the population of 65 years and older 
to the population under 65 years. 
36 This argument is supported by findings from Reinhardt, Hussey and Anderson (2002) and Anderson and 
Poullier (1999). They show for example that the ratio of average income of physicians to average employee 
compensation was 5.5 in the U.S. in 1996 compared to 3.4 in Germany which was the second highest. 
  30certain health care systems and to emphasize the importance of personal responsibility. A 
good mix of competition between the care providers and sickness funds respectively and a 
modern design which accentuates personal responsibility via deductibles and co-
payments for example seems to be the only possible situation. Fetzer and Raffelhüschen 
(2005) have shown that such a mix could reduce the intertemporal public liabilities caused 
by the German health insurance to nearly zero while Kotlikoff (2003) stresses the point of 
competition for reforming Medicare. Klusen (2003) shows that also in a social health 
insurance scheme competition can be induced over the scope of benefits.  
Surely, there is no golden rule for every system and each has its cultural idiosyncrasies 
which nobody wants to touch. But all analysed systems will face the same problems in the 
future which is why the direction of the path of reform is also the same in general. 
 
5.    Summary and Conclusion 
During the next few decades the populations of most developed countries will grow 
older and older as a result of the low level of birth rates since the 1970s and/or the 
continuously increasing life expectancy. Generational Accounting which was introduced in 
the early nineties, can illustrate the effects of this ageing process on a country’s fiscal 
situation. 
We quantify for France, Germany, Switzerland and the U.S. how unsustainable their 
public finances are due to the demographic development. We show that the demographic 
effect alone produces a major problem for all analysed countries except Switzerland. A 
special focus is put on their social health insurance system. Due to the speciality of the 
cost-increasing effect of the medical-technical progress one can justifiably say that social 
health insurance schemes are the major drivers behind unsustainable fiscal policies. Even 
Switzerland which would be without its social health insurance a formidable example of 
sustainability has to raise significantly taxes to cope with future deficits or will have to 
make painful transfer cuts. The only way out of this fiscal Armageddon is in our opinion to 
introduce more market forces and to emphasize the role of personal responsibility. 
Our study is surely imperfect and intensive research remains to be done. For a really 
flawless international comparison one would have to control for the business cycle and its 
effect on the base year’s budgets. Furthermore more research is needed on how the 
medical-technical progress quantitatively affects the cost per recipient and if differences in 
this respect occur between OECD countries. 
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  35Appendix 
Figure 11: Sustainability gaps of the four countries and shares of public 
health insurance systems - accouting for medical-technical progress
Base year 2002, r=3%, g=1,5%


















































Table 3: Sustainability Gaps of the Public Sector (in per cent of GDP) 









  Germany  Switzer-
land  U.S. France Germany Switzer-
land  U.S. 
 
r = 3% 
g = 1% 
 
220.0 244.1  123.6  419.3 355.6 344.3  200.3  716.7 
 
 r = 3% 
g = 1.5% 
 
294.3 316.9  64.4 656.6 484.8 456.4  173.8  1141.1
 
 r = 3% 
g = 2% 
 
434.6 445.8  -79.3  1237.
7  726.0 657.9  94.1  2175.1
 
 r = 4% 
g = 2% 
 
222.2 246.3  44.0 425.6 357.9 346.5  120.7  724.5 
 
 r = 4.5% 
g = 2% 
 
177.5 200.6  56.9 305.0 279.2 276.3  114.1  507.8 
 
 r = 5% 
g = 2% 
 
148.1 169.4  62.5 234.6 227.0 228.6  106.7  381.0 
 
 
  36Table 4: Sustainability Gaps of the Health Sector (in per cent of GDP) 









  Germany  Switzer-
land  U.S. France Germany Switzer-
land  U.S. 
 
r = 3% 
g = 1% 
 
35.7 47.7  25.6  213.9 171.2 147.9  102.3  511.3 
 
 r = 3% 
g = 1.5% 
 
55.2 66.8  36.5  355.7 245.7 206.2  145.9  840.2 
 
 r = 3% 
g = 2% 
 
91.9 101.3  57.1  708.9 383.3 313.4  230.5  1646.4
 
 r = 4% 
g = 2% 
 
36.2 48.3  25.9  217.6 171.9 148.5  102.7  516.5 
 
 r = 4.5% 
g = 2% 
 
24.7 36.4  19.3  146.2 126.3 112.1  76.4 349.0 
 
 r = 5% 
g = 2% 
 
17.2 28.3  14.9  104.6 96.1 87.6  59.1  251.0 
 
Note: The indicator future generations’ burden reacts to changes of the growth-
discount-spread in exactly the same way as the sustainability gap which is why we do not 
provide an extra analysis. The sustainability gaps of France, Germany and the U.S. behave 
as expected i.e. the sustainability gap decreases with a widening of the growth-interest-
spread. In the case of Switzerland its excess revenues are discounted more heavily with a 
larger spread which is why its implicit property is shrinking. Furthermore the level of the 
growth rate is important because of the way pension benefits are calculated due to the 
tenth revision of the Swiss public pension system (see subsection 2.2.3). As higher the 
absolute growth rate is, as heavier are future benefits of the public pension system 
relatively discounted. This is why the sustainability gaps of the public sector differ between 
the first (r=3% and g=1.5%) and the fourth scenario (r=4% and g=2%). Minor differences 
between these two scenarios in case of the other three countries are due to the practical 
computing of the cash flows to infinity. After 306 periods, we stop our calculation 
described in chapter 2 and compute an annuity for the residual cash flows. 
  37Table 5: Revenue Gaps of the Public Sector  
(initial tax quotas in parentheses in per cent of GDP) 
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Table 6: Transfer Gaps of the Public Sector  
(initial transfer quotas in parentheses in per cent of GDP) 
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  38Table 7: Revenue Gaps of the Health Sector  
(initial tax quotas in parentheses in per cent of GDP) 
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Table 8: Transfer Gaps of the Public Sector  
(initial transfer quotas in parentheses in per cent of GDP) 
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